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THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SOCIAL BOND 
James J. Chriss, Cleveland State University 
Abstract 
Travis Hirschi's control or social bonding theory argues that those persons who have strong and 
abiding attachments to conventional society (in the form of attaciuIlcnts, involvement, invest-
ment, and belief) are less likely to deviate than persons who have weak or shallow bonds. Later, 
Gottfredson and Hirschi moved away from the social bond as the primary factor in deviance, and 
toward an emphasis on self-control. In short, low self-control is associated with higher levels of 
deviance and criminality irrespective of the strength or weakness of one's social bonds. In this 
article I argue that Talcott Parsons' AGIL schema easily incorporates Hirschi's social bond into its 
broader analytical framework. Flllthermore, from within the logical framework of Parsons' 
system, Hirschi's move from an emphasis on social bonds to an emphasis on self-control is wholly 
compatible with, and even anticipated by, the AGIL schema. The article illustrates, and argues for, 
the continuing importance of theoretical subsumption in sociology and criminology. Lastly, a set 
of testable hypotheses is generated based upon this theoretical retornmlation. 
INTRODUCTION: CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
THEORETICAL SUBSUMPTION 
Criminological theories are, by their very essence, middle-- range (or lower--level) theo--
ries, which seek to explain those specifiC features of human social systems related to 
criminality.l The aspect" of crime or the criminal that are pertinent to any particular 
criminological theory are established by way of the theory's initial and scope conditions, 
whether these are stated formally or discursively (see Smelser 1969; Walker and Cohen 
1985; Gibbs 1994; Wagner 2000). }"lost proponents of this middle-orange approach to 
criminological theory argue that criminal behavior is a complex affair that requires 
specialized, lower--level theories to adequately deal with the specific types of human 
conduct and social situations that are said to be characteristic of criminality or deviance. 
Among the competing visions of 'ivhat the proper aims of science are or should be, 
one of the better known is the ideal of a comprehensive or "grand" theory that would 
integrate all the domains of science in terms of a common set of principles. This 
comprehensive theory would in effect serve as the foundation for all less--inclusive 
theories (Hovard 1971).1 In his discussion of theoretical reduction or subsumption, 
Nagel (1979:3367) states that " . . . in any case, the phenomenon of a relatively autono 
mous theory becoming absorbed by, or reduced to, some other more inclusive theory is 
an undeniable and recurrent feature of the history of modern science," and "there is 
every reason to suppose that such reduction will continue to take place in the future." 
~- For their helpful suggestions for improvement of earlier versions of this paper, I thank Teresa laGrange, 
Thomas Farara, Victor Lidz, and the three anonymous reviewers of The Sociological Quarterl}: Direct all 
correspondence to James I. Chriss, Department of Sociology, 2121 Euclid Ave., Cleveland, 0 H H115; e-mail: 
j.chriss@csuchio.edu 
Talcott Parsons spenl a long career producing such a general theory, one which he 
claimed was inclusive enough lo provide explanalions not only for all of sociology's 
major phenomena, but for those of neighboring social and behavioral sciences as well 
(see, e.g., Parsons 1991). Notwithstanding the bombasl and sociological imperialism of 
some aspecL':I of Parsons' theorelical agenda, no one in sociology has yet to malch 
Parsons' accomplishments in suslaining a viable program of grand, general, or syslems 
theory (Miinch 1981, 1982; Alexander 1983; Hamilton 1996; Lidz 2000; Trevino 2001). 
Much of the criticism and ultimate rejection of Parsons lhal occurred beginning in the 
late 1950s was based on ideological or noncognitive points of contention (see especially 
Mills 1959; Gouldner 1970) as much as (or more lhan) on cognilive criteria (Le., 
rigorous tests of elements of the theory byway of the criteria oflogical analysis, cognitive 
significance, or predictive power; see Hempel 1965; Stinchcombe 1968; Dubin 1969; 
Gibbs 1972; Cohen 1989).3 
The revival of interesl in Parsons' body of work has been steadily growing since the 
early 1980s, and, concomitantly, issues that were once considered "settled" are being 
revisited anew. Theorelical reduclion is one such issue that deserves to be revisiled. Il is 
in this spirit that I describe Hirschi's (1969) control theory and hiler self-conlrol theory 
(Gollfredson and Hirschi 1990) as subsumable under Parsons' general theory. 
HIRSCHI AND PARSONS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
It has been over 35 years since Travis Hirschi (1969) first presented his widely discussed 
and influential control theory ofdelinquency and crime. Tntereslingly, however, during all 
Lbis time Lbere has been no explicit recognition-either byHirschi himself or by others in 
the criminology or social lheory fields -----of the sharp convergence belween Hirschi's 
notion of lhe four dimensions of the social bond and Talcott Parsons' AGJL schema. I say 
this, of course, knowing fully well the vastness of the lilerature, as bOlb Hirschi and 
Parsons are heavily discussed and cited aULbors. Il is certainly possible Lbat somewhere 
someone has acknowledged lheir convergence in print.. However, no one in the major 
criminology, criminal justice, and sociology journals that I have reviewed has done so. 
Nevertheless, a fe"w authors have noted broad parallels between Parsons and Hirschi, 
and these deserve brief mention. In his overview and SUllllllary of the concept of social 
control, Robert !v'leier (1982) argues that Parsons' notion of social control was part of 
the functionalist response, "Ilhich made explicit, much more so than in previous formu-
lations, the association between social control and deviance. Parsons and the function-
alists conceptualized society as a more or less stable system which, in order to counteract 
deviant or destabilizing tendencies, evolved sanctioning mechanisms for the purpose of 
restoring and maintaining the orderly operation of the system. It is then a small step 
to go from explicitly linking social control and deviance functionally to a normative 
conception of deviance and social control (following Durkheim and Freud), whereby 
deviance and social control are both explained as outcomes of socialization: When 
socialization ,,,corks well, persons are drawn into closer contact with conventional society 
(Meier 1982:46). This latter move is, in essence, the control theory of Hirschi (1969). 
Here, we see Meier linking Parsons to Hirschi indirectly through the socialization 
theories of Durkheim and Freud. 
This is similar to lhe argument of Debra Umberson (1987), who argues for lhe 
indirect inl1uence of social conlrol as experienced through informal pressures to 
conform as exerted prirr1'lrily through the family. Umberson (1987 :309) groups Parsons 
and Hirschi (along with a few olhers) under this model of self-control atlained through 
socialization and the internalizalion of norms and values within the context of family 
and olher informal agents of controL 
In a similar vein, Charles Tiltle (1977) proposes a list of variables, representing 
various theoretical and research traditions, which has been used to explain some aspect 
of confonnilY and its counlerparl, deviance. For example, functionalist theorist,;;, led by 
Parsons, argue moral commilment to norms and values is one of the primary determi-
nants of conformity. Another theoretical tradilion, which Tittle refers to as social inte· 
gralion, emphasizes the importance of relational bonds in reducing or checking 
deviance. The classical innovator of this tradition is Durkheim, and Hirschi follows his 
lead by stressing the exlent of individual integration into ongoing group life as the prime 
determinanl of the willingness lo conform (Tiltle 1977:581). Again, although TillIe does 
not make explicit the connection between Parsons and Hirschi in this article, their 
indirecllinkage through Durkheim is readily visible. 
Tn addition to these articles, there have been several attempls to integrate social 
control theory with olher prominent lheories of delinquency and crime, including 
labeling, social learning, rouline activities, ditTerential association, and strain or anomie 
theory (see, e.g., Cernkovich 1978; Aultman and \'Vellford 1979; Segrave and Haslad 
1983; Giordano 1989; Fararo and Skvoretz 1997; Akers 1998; Hawdon 1999; for a 
summary of this literalure, see Liska, Krohn, and Messner 1989; Williams and :rv1cShane 
1999:201-202). However, none of Lbese works deal explicitly with Parsons. 
THE ElEMENTS OF THE SOCIAL BOND 
Going beyond prior analyses, which hint at parallels between Parsons and Hirschi, I 
argue that there exists a deep and abiding linkage between the two theorists. The explicit 
point of contact is the close correspondence between Hirschi's four dimensions of the 
social bond and the four functions of Parsons' AGIL schema. Not only is Hirschi's 
control (or social bond) theory subsumable under Parsons' more general and abstract 
.AGIL theory; his later turn toward an emphasis on self-control (see, e.g., Hirschi and 
Gottti'edson2000) is wholly predictable based upon the logic and framework of Parsons' 
elaboration of the cybernetic schema, which in effect clarifies the analytical relations 
among the four functions. 
The alignment of the dimensions of the social bond and the functions is as follmvs: 
attachment serves the function of integration 0); commitment serves the function of 
goal-attainment (G); involvement serves the function of adaptation (A); and beliefserves 
the function of latent pattern-maintenance (L). This will be elaborated more fully 
shortly. 
TABLE 1. Elements of the Social Bond' 
Level Element Description 
Behavioral Involvement Time spent in conventional activities 
Cognitive Commitment Rational calculation of the costs of lawbreaking for future goals 
Affective Attadlment Emotional closeness to family, peers, and sdlOols 
Evaluative Belief Ideas that suprorl a conventional orientation 
'Adapted from Hirschi (1969) and Livingston (1996). 
Hirschi's social control theory is in essence an extension and refinement of 
Durkheim's ([1897] 1951) notion that persons are more likely to deviate \vhen they are 
poorly integrated into ongoing group relations. Indeed, Hirschi (1969:16) ciles apprm'--
ingly the tollowing passage from Durkheim ([1897] 1951 :209): 
The more weakened the groups to which [lhe individual] belongs, the less he 
depends on them, the more he consequently depends only on himself and recognizes 
no other rules of conducllhan whal are founded on his privale interests. 
Hence, control theory assumes that deviance------Dr delinquency specifically for purposes 
of Hirschi's argument-------results 'ivhen an individual's bond to conventional sociely is 
weak or broken. This concept~ the social bond, is the central analytic in Hirschi's schema. 
Hirschi's control theory is summarized in Table l. 
To summarize briefly, Hirschi suggest" that the more attached persons are to other 
members of society, the more they believe in the values of conventional society, and the 
more they invest in and are involved in conventiona llines of activity, the less likely they are 
lo deviate. Needless to say, there has been an enormous amount writlen over the years 
about Hirschi's social bonding theory and later general theory of crime (which shifts the 
focus from social conlrol to self-control). Tests of the theories have produced a'ivide 
assortment offindings, much of which are supportive, \vhile others are mixed or negative 
(see, e.g., Hindelang 1973; Hagan and Simpson 1977; 'Viatrowski, Griswold, and Roberts 
1981; Matsueda 1982; Thompson, Mitchell, and Dodder 1984; Greenberg 1985; Fried 
man and Rosenbaum 1988; LaGrange and Silverman 1999; Geis 2000; Nakhaie, Silver-
man, and LaCrange. 2000; Marcus 2004). :tvly purpose here, ho-wever, is not to contribute 
to the already vast literature regarding the veracity, validity, reliability, or utility of 
Hirschi's control theory. Rather, I intend to show that Hirschi's earlier control theory, as 
well as GoUfredson's and Hirschi's later general theory of crime (which emphasizes 
self-control rather than social bonds), are both special cases of, and can be subsumed 
under, Parsons' AGIL schema and his later cybernetic hierarchy of control. 
PARSONS' FOUR PHASES 
Although some authors make the claim that Parsons' turn to cybernetics later in his 
career represents an analytical break from functionalism per se, I would argue that 
Parsons' cybernetic turn supplements, but does not replace, the basic functionalist 
orientation of his general theoretical project. Peter Hamilton (1996) concisely captured 
the various phases of Parsons' career, referring to them as Parsonsc, Parsons\ Parsons2, 
and Parsons3• Parsonsc represenls the earliesl, preparatory phase of Parsons' career 
(before 1935), where his major contributions were not only in the field of economics but 
also in social lheory (e.g., his lranslation into English of\'Veber's Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit ofCapitalism in 1930). The nexl phase, Parsons\ running from Lbe publication of 
Structure ofSocial Action in 1937 on lhrough to the mid--1940s, represents the beginnings 
of Parsons' generallheoretical project, particularly as this relaled to the developmenl of 
a voluntaristic theory of action, which sought to incorporate subjectivist elements that 
had been "squeezed oul" of theories of human action under the sway of positivism, 
behaviorism, and ulilitarianism. The full elaboration of a functionalisl and social systems 
orienlalion was launched in the Parsons2 phase, represented in the works of Parsons and 
his collaborators published in lhe decade from 1951 lhrough the early 1960s. Finally, 
Parsons\ the cybernelic phase, ran from the mid-1960s until Parsons' death in 1979. 
Even with the advenl of the last Parsonsc> phase, however, commitrnent to the major 
aspecls of funclionalist theorizing, especially Lbe AGJL schema, remained intact. What 
the cybernetic turn accomplished for Parsons was the clarification of lhe relationship 
between the four functions within various subsystems of the social system, as well as the 
human social system in relation to the cosmos and beyond, as represented in the "lmman 
condition" paradigm, the final elaboration of Parsons' (1978) grand lheory. In Lbis last 
phase, Parsons was influenced most directly by Norbert \Viener (1961), who pioneered 
the application of cybernetics to explanations in social science. The cybernetic principle 
slates simply "things high in information control things high in energy." A good example 
of this principle is Lbe thermostat. A thermostal is high in information in that if il is set 
at 68 degrees, it will regulate the heat of the room, which is high in energy. Cybernetics 
assumes Lbat human and nonhuman organizations constitute systems which are goal-
seeking and which atlempt lo maintain a moving or slable state equilibrium, such as lhe 
thermostat maintaining the room's temperature at 68 degrees (Deutsch 1963:95). 
As depicted in Figure 1, lhe four subsystems of lhe hUII1'ln condition represenllhe 
mosl general level possible for purposes of social analysis in that there is a physical or 
chemical realm (A), an organic realm (G), an action realm (1), and a nonempirical realm 
(the telic system, which serves the L-function). If one begins at lhis most abstract, 
human condition level, one may then descend to lower analytical levels by way of any 
selected subsystem. In Figure 1, the I-subsystem of the human condition, namely the 
action system, can be broken dmvn into its own subsystems (depicted in the box on 
the bottom right portion of the fit=:,'1lre), each serving one of the four functions of AGIL. 
One may then continue on and select one of these subsystems (the social system for 
example), which again can be broken dm"rn into a still lower-level subsystem (the box 
on the bottom left), and so on. 
Parsons argued that with regard to the frame of reference of the general action 
system, the cultural system (L) stands at the pinnacle of the cybernetic hierarchy because 
it is high in information and "controls" virtually everything connected with the mean-
ingful and purposive behavior of human beings . .? With the function of latent pattern-
maintenance standing at the top of the cybernetic hierarchy, the next level down is the 
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FIGURE 1. General Paradigm of the Human Condition and Selected Subsystems. 
is represented by the social system itself. Culture in a sense is the ultimate and most 
generalized medium of interchange, which circulates throughout the social system, and 
the social system itself represents the most general but nevertheless concrete patterning 
of human energy. Social systems, in effect, represent the integration of human beings 
moving about in space and time. 
The next level down in the cybernetic hierarchy of control is the function of goal-
attainment (G), and with regard to the frame of reference of the general action system, 
this is represented by the human personality. The human personality represents the 
integration of need-dispositions, this being accomplished as a result of the human 
organism's experiencing the socialization process whereby he or she learns a particular 
set of cultural norms, values, and standards. 
At the lowest level of the cybernetic hierarchy stands the function of adaptation (A), 
which is represented by the behavioral system. When a baby is born, he or she is a blank 
slate, which, although high in energy, has no guidelines for organizing or directing his or 
her behavior. Only with socialization can a cultural code be internalized and integrated 
into the personality. 
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FIGURE 2. Cybernetic Hierarchy of the General Action System. 
Hence, we see Parsons applying the principles of cybernetics to explain the human 
action system, and how information and feedback mechanisms provide modifications 
and growth of both human beings themselves and the social systems which evolve from 
their concerted behavior. Culture, high in information and serving the function of 
pattern maintenance (L), is passed down to the human child who is high in energy and 
who through his or her behavior adapts (A) to the environment and responds to a 
variety of stimuli as he or she goes through the socialization process. The behavioral 
system of the child gets organized one level higher up when the personality-the 
motivational system-is formed through ongoing socialization, as the child's behavior 
is channeled toward the seeking of certain goals or end states (G) appropriate to the 
social context and the prevailing cultural heritage. Finally, the activities of each person, 
endowed with personalities which direct them toward the attainment of certain goals, 
create a tapestry of interlocking role relationships which produces the patterned regu-
larities which we know as social institutions and, ultimately, social systems (I). (This 
process is depicted in Figure 2.) 
PARSONS AND ATTACHMENT: A CLOSER LOOK 
In order to understand how Hirschi's theory of delinquency "plugs into" Parsons' more 
general and abstract theory of social systems, it is first necessary to understand the 
"action frame of reference." For Parsons, the analytical elements of social systems must 
be understood from within the frame of reference he called "action." The action frame 
of reference incorporates the essential levels of reality involving the human organism's 
relation to its environment, to subjective orientations and states of mind of actors, to the 
social system as a collectivity, and to the cultural systems of meaning prevalent in any 
social system. In effect, action treats human behavior as "goal-oriented," as "adaptive," as 
"motivated," and as guided by symbolic processes (Parsons 1961:32). 
Keeping in mind the four functions and the cybernetic relationship between them, 
we now return to Hirschi's theory of the social bond and an examination of the parallels 
between it and Parsons' theory. Table 2 summarizes the parallels between Parsons' 
TABLE 2. A Comparison of Parsons and Hirschi 
Functions (Parsons) Tbe social bond (Hirsc.bt) 
Latency (L) Belief 
Integration (I) Attachment 
Goal-attainrnent (G) Commitment 
Adaptation (A) Involvement 
four- function, or AGJL schema, and Hirschi's theory of the social bond. In effect, what 
can be specified are the functions of the elements of the social bond from within the 
action frame of reference. In olher words, with lhe help of Parsons' schema, we may now 
explicate lhe functions of the elements of the social bond. 
From the perspective of the social system itself, the primary"goal" of the syslem is lo 
prepare persons lo take on Lbe staluses or posilions required lo maintain the system as 
a going concern. Society as a goal--directed system will seek to maintain equilibrium and 
lo avoid disequilibrium and, in the worst-case scenario, disintegration. As imporlanl 
elements or units wilhin the syslem, human beings musl be motivated lo behave in ways 
Lbat contribute to Lbe continuing operation of the social system. The two main classes of 
mechanisms assuring such motivaled action are the mechanisms of socialization and the 
mechanisms of social control. As Parsons, Shils, and Olds (1951) go on to explain, 
The mechanisTfl'; of socialization are lhose mechanisms which form the need--
dispositions making for a generalized readiness to fulfill lhe major patterns of 
role--expectation which an individual will encounter. (p. 227) 
Since no empirical syslem is in perfect equilibrium, there will be inevilable failures of the 
socialization system to motivate conformilY across all units (Parsons 1951:298). The 
failure of socialization (e.g., the Freudian notion of slunted or incomplete socialization 
which produces in the child an underdeveloped Superego) is disruptive of lhe social 
order, and it is the function of Lbe mechanisms of social control to maintain Lbe system 
in a state of stable or moving equilibrium (Parsons et a1. 1951:228). However, social 
conlrol does nol arise merely in those situations where a clear breach of the social order 
has occurred (in the case of legal violations which set into motion the machinery of the 
criminal justice system). The orderly and routine workings of the socialization process 
provides a steady stream of symbolic equivalents of the expectations of the group, both 
general and specific, which are inculcated and made visibly present from the beginning. 
In essence, primary socialization, occurring within the contexts of family, church, peers, 
and so forth, is equivalent to informal social controL It is within these early critical stages 
that the personality of the child is formed, through contact with agents of primary 
socialization. Nevertheless, these value orientations must be continually reinforced 
against pressures toward disruption in both the personality and social systems, and 
hence, a formal system of control arises as a parallel to the informal system. 
The most important point to take from this discussion is that, for Parsons, social-
ization and social control are analytically very similar. For example, Parsons (1951) 
states that 
There are such close relations between lhe processes of socializalion and of social 
control that we may take certain features of the processes of socialization as a point 
of reference for developing a framework for the analysis of the processes of control. 
(p.298) 
For the mosl parl, social control is prevenlive or forestalling in nalure in lhal it consists 
of teaching actors not to embark on processes of deviance, while socialization is positive 
in the sense of teaching persons how to do rather than how nol to do. Even furlher, bOlh 
social control and socialization are processes which involve human actors adjusting to 
slrains. From the poinl of view of lhe motivational complex of lhe personality system, 
strain provokes four basic lypes of reaction: anxiely, fantasy, hostility or aggression, and 
defensive measures. A crucial element in the mechanisms of social control is "support," 
which provides a basis of reassurance such Lbat less severe reaclions to strain-for 
example, anxiety or fantasy -----will nol escalate into aggressiveness or defensiveness. As 
Parsons (1951) explains, 
Support may be of various kinds, but the common element is thal somewhere there 
is lhe incorporation or retention of ego in a solidary relationship so lhal he has a 
basis of security in the sense of lhe above discussions. (p. 299) 
'Athat Parsons is suggesting is thal if persons reacting to strain can find support in the 
form of, say, a loving parent, close friends, or even the therapeulic alliance forged wilh 
a therapist, they will be less likely to engage in lhe kinds of serious deviance that call 
forlh agents of legal control. This is roughly equivalent to the allachment dimension of 
Hirschi's social bond. Of Lbe four elements of the social bond, attachment mosl directly 
implicates primary groups such as families and peers. Attachment is, again, the affective 
or emotional aspect of Lbe social bond. Tn this sense, altachment serves an integrative 
function wilh respecl to the social bond more generally. 
HIRSCHI AND THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF ATTACHMENTS AND BELIEFS 
Hirschi (1969:83----109) devotes an en lire chapter lo youths' atladnnenllo parents, and 
a brief summary of these findings are in order. As Hirschi (1969:83) states, "Control 
theory assumes that the bond of affection for conventional persons is a major deterrent 
to crime." Children's attachment to their parents is, according to Hirschi, one of the 
single best predictors of delinquency: as attachment to parents weakens, delinquency 
increases. Granted, being attached or bonded to a parent means that the child is likely to 
be more heavily supervised and more often in the presence of parents than children with 
weaker bonds. l-lm"rever, delinquent acts do not take much time to commit, so this sort 
of "direct control" explanation is only partial at best. 
Even more important is the moral element in the attachment and this is where the 
content of beliefs -within relationships playa crucial role. The idea is that even though a 
parent may be physically distant from a child who is considering committing a deviant 
act, the parent nevertheless could be psychologically present when s11ch temptations 
arise. A child who asks himself or herself "What will my parents think?" at the moment 
of temptation, tends to exhibit more strongly the moral component of attachment than 
a child whose conscience does not prompl him or her in the same way. This sort of 
"indirect control"-by way of beliefs-is more important than attachments repre-
sented, for example, by lhe direct., supervisory activities of parents seeking to restrict lhe 
activities of their children. A person who identifies himself or herself as a conventional 
person, that is, as one who cares about what others lhink about him or her, and who has 
properly internalized the expectations of significant others within his or her personality 
system (speciiically within the self or Ego), is less likely to deviate. Such persons are also 
more likely to consider the long-term consequences of lheir actions and indeed, as 
suggested by Hirschi and Goltfredson (1993:49) many years later, this predisposition is 
an important indicator of self-controL Tn sum, lhe acceplance of the moral validity of 
society's rules, represenled by respect for significanl others in the concrele and respect 
for law in lhe abstract (I.e., legal socialization), is a crucial elemenl in the production of 
norm--conforming behavior (I.e Bane and Caplan 1993). 
CYBERNETICS AND THE SOCIAL BOND 
As discussed earlier, the cybernetic ordering of lhe four functions of Parsons' AGII. 
schema is always in lhe direclion of I. =:::} I =:::} G =:::} A (see Figure 2). Likewise, lhe cyber--
netic ordering of the elements of Hirschi's social bond is (from high in information to 
high in enerf..'Y) belief =:::} attachment =:::} commitment =:::} involvement (see Table 2). The 
social bond is besl placed within what Parsons called the societal community, which is 
the inlegrative subsystem of the social system (see Fif:,JUre 1). 'Alhere power is the gen--
eralized medium of the polity (to be discussed more fully below) and money is the 
generalized medium of the economy, the societal communily's generalized medium is 
influence. As a generalized medium, inl1uence consists in a specialized type of perfor-
mative capacity. As Lidz (2001:161) explains, influence " ... involves an actor's capacity 
lo invoke relalionships of solidarilY wilh other actors as means of affecting their deci-
sions regarding presenl or future courses of aClion." 
The generalized symbolic medium of inl1uence anchored in the societal community 
is to be understood as concerned primarily with the enforcement of norms, but in the 
sense of using persuasion ',Illthin the context of small groups and other aspects of 
collective solidarity (I.e., informal control). Another sort of norm enforcement, rel1ect-
ing the workings of formal control, emanates from the polity (or government), and 
seated here is the generalized medium of power (Parsons 1967). Inl1uence as a medium 
of informal control ,,,corks as an appeal to conscience within the context of solidarity 
relations. On the other hand, the legal system specifies a range of formal norms (laws), 
which are binding on citizens, in that violation of laws may generate negative sanctions 
such as fines, imprisonment, or even death. Regulated enforcement of laws are left to 
specialized agents of formal control, hence the specialized institutions fulfilling the 
goal-attainment function for the polity-in the special case of enforcement of legal 
norms-are the criminal justice system (with its subsystems of courts, corrections, and 









FIGURE 3. The Fiduciary System. 
Even though the social bond, as an integrative system, is located within the societal 
community, there are of course important interchanges going on between elements of 
the social bond and the polity (G) as well the fiduciary system, which is the (L) or latent 
pattern-maintenance subsystem of the social system. There are four institutional sub-
systems located within the fiduciary system: education (A), family (G), civil society (or 
what Parsons calls the "moral community;' which fulfills the I function), and religion (L; 
see Figure 3). Each of these institutions serves socialization functions; hence, the sym-
bolic medium operating here is value commitments. The family is concerned primarily 
with affective, or expressive, socialization, while educational institutions, for example, 
are concerned primarily with cognitive (or instrumental) socialization. 
This is a fiduciary system in that all of the institutions located here are investing their 
own resources for an anticipated later "payoff' for the social system more generally. The 
resources of education (A) are invested for the development of a well-informed citizenry 
and the placement of individuals within the economic system. The resources of the 
family (G) are invested for the development of stable, well-adjusted personalities. The 
resources of the civil society (I) are invested for the development of a stable citizenry, 
whereby persons are attached to political institutions and participate in the civic life of 
the community. Finally, the resources of religion (L) are invested for the spiritual 
well-being of persons as well as the ultimate "payoff' of salvation or grace for those who 
faithfully follow the teachings of their religion in this life. 
Since socialization institutions such as the family are concerned with assuring the 
value commitments-or the fiduciary bonds---of and between their members, it is 
obvious that the starting point for assuring stable social bonds to conventional others is 
a level ofbeliefin the goodness or justness, or even the validity of the immediate structures 
of primary groups as well as of society in the abstract (as discussed above). Following the 
logic of the cybernetic hierarchy, then, belief is "highest" in information relative to the 
other elements of the social bond. Next highest in information is attachment, which is the 
integrative element of the social bond, and which families especially attempt to ensure 
through the socialization of their young. Commitrnent is the goal-auainment element of 
Lbe social bond, and it is lower in information and somewhat higher in energy in relation 
to belief and attachments. As the primary socialization agent, the family enters here lo lhe 
exlent thal through socialization, personality is formed, meaning that individuals are 
provided guidance as to which goals should be pursued. As Parsons and Plall (1973:21) 
suggest, "Thus, sociologisL') commonly think that a primary function of kinship, espe-
cially of the modern nuclear family, is lo order the motivations of individuals in relation 
lo their social roles." Finally, involvement serves the adaptation function of the social 
bond, and is "highest" in energy relative to lhe other elements of the bond. 
THE MOVE TO SElF-CONTROl 
Tn lheir A.. General Theory ofCrime, Gottfredson, and Hirschi (1990) abandoned explicit 
reference to social bonds in favor of self-control as the primary factor in the explanation 
of crime and delinquency. By admission of Hirschi and Gottfredson as well as outside 
commentators, ilappeared lhat the move from social conlrol (byway of lhe social bond) 
to self-conlrol was radical, something akin lo an epistemological or analytical rupture 
(see, e.g., Taylor 2001). '''thy was this change made? Hirschi (2004) explains that 
After examining age dislributions of crimes and analogous acts, Gotlfredson and T 
reversed my original position, concluding Lbat these acts are, afler all, manifestations 
of low self control on the part of the offender. (p. 540) 
According to lhe original social bonding theory of Hirschi, delinquency and crime were 
more a manifestation of the strength or weakness of the social bonds between the 
offender and olhers than of the particular characleristics of the offender. For Gottfred-
son and Hirschi, lhe stable differences in crime rates across group and individual levels 
Lbat they discovered (see Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983) seemed to suggesl Lbat, rather 
than social bonds, the strenf..'th of which can l1uctuate over time and wilh changes in lhe 
social and economic siluations of individuals, the explanation of crime would more 
likely be found in one's level of self-control. 
Bul where does self-conlrol come from? Gottfredson and Hirschi admit thatil begins 
early in life and is relatively impervious to change later in life. Indeed, the authors adopted 
a "child-rearing model" to account for the origins of (or conversely, the failure to learn) 
self-control (Hirschi 200£1:541). This move places great emphasis on the importance of 
primary groups and especially the socialization function of the family. Gottfredson and 
Hirschi never traced out the implications of the continuing importance of the family for 
the formation and stabllityof social bonds, orforthe establishment of self-control. To the 
extent that Hirschi's theory is now subsumed under Parsons' AGIL schema, we would 
expect that both the social bond and self-control will be highly cor related with each other 
since they are both products of the socialization system (as understood within the 
Parsonian framework). The suggestion, then, is that it is helpful to trace out the linkages 
between the family as an institution and the personality system, as reconstructed via 
Parsons' AGILschema. The personality system becomes an important part of this analysis 
because self-control is a psychological concept. As viewed through the framework of 
Parsons' system, the move from social control to self-control is neither as radical nor as 
surprising as it has been made out to be (see, e.g., Taylor 2001). Indeed, the move "makes 
sense" once the logic of the cybernetic hierarchy of control is brought to bear. 
THE LINK BETWEEN FAMILY AND PERSONALITY 
Reiterating a point made earlier, for Parsons, the family and personality are intimately 
connected. Here is some of what Parsons (1955) has had to say on this issue: 
The most important implication of this view is that the functions of the family in a 
highly differentiated society are not to be interpreted as functions directly on behalf 
of the society, but on behalf of personality.... [Families] are factories which pro-
duce human personality. (p. 16) 
Figure 4 offers a schematization of the linkages between the family and the personality 
system according to Parsons' AGIL schema. As we have seen, the personality system 
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FIGURE 4. The Family-Identity Connection. 
fulfills the function of goal--allainment at lhe action system level. As the integrative 
subsystem of the action system, the social system is involved in a double interchange 
wilh lhe personality system, and lhis double inlerchange Parsons and Platt (1973:435) 
describe as the "motivational integralion syslem." This simply refers to lhe fact thal 
social systems are populaled by hurmm beings who, because of socialization, have an 
integrated set of need-dispositions (Lbe personalily) that steers them (lypically) toward 
engaging in norm--conforming behavior. 
Following lhe logic of Parsons' schema, each of these action system subsyslems-
social syslem and personality-------are broken down one further level into their own four 
subsystems. For our purposes, we are especially interested in the L-subsystem of the 
social syslem, which is lhe fiduciary system. Likewise, the personalily system is broken 
down into the subsystems of Id (A), Ego (G), Superego (I), and identity (L). Parsons 
(1968b) follows Freud in conceplualizing the personality as composed of the functional 
components of Jd, Ego (or self), and Superego (the conscience), plus identity, the latter 
of which stands at lhe pinnacle of the cybernetic hierarchy of the personality syslem 
insofar as identity is the organized attributes of all the resources embodied in the lhree 
lower--level Freudian componenls. In addition, idenlily (or one's self-concept in a par--
ticular role or social situation) is considered to be Lbe most stable fealure of the per-
sonality system, and hence, at this analYlicallevel, it provides both pallern maintenance 
and tension management for the person. 
Notice not only lhal identity fulfills lhe L--function for the personality syslem, but 
also that families, which as we have seen reflect thal aspecl of the fiduciary system 
primarily concerned with lhe affeclive socialization of young children (but also with 
Lbe stabilization of adult persona lilies), are the primary "factory" for the production 
of personality. Even further, Parsons conceives of "affect" as lhe generalized medium of 
interchange circulating in lhe social syslem, where affect is understood as a contentless 
medium mediating the relations of actors from lhe perspective of the internal environ--
ment of action (Parsons and Plall1973:83). The family, of course, specializes in airective 
socialization of lhe young, while Hirschi's notion of atladnnenl fulfills the inlegrative 
function for the social bond, which in turn is conceplualized al the affective level (as 
opposed to the evaluative, cognitive, or behavioral levels). 
The personality system has its own medium of interchange, ,,,chich Parsons and Platt 
(1973>135) refer to as "performance capacityo" As Parsons and Platt (1973) explain, 
The basis for considering performance-capacity a scarce medium that circulates [in 
the personality] is essentially the same as that just outlined tor intelligence [for the 
behavioral system] .... [F] or performance-capacity, the compensating income cat-
egory is cathexis of objects-motivational commitment to act appropriately in 
relation to them (po 78) 
The part of the personality known as the Superego (serving the integrative function), 
embodies the end product of all these various levels of affect operating at the social 
system level, the family level (Leo, at the fiduciary system level), and elsewhere: social-
ization that is complete and which delivers an appropriate moral template reflecting the 
value-standards of that society will inculcate a conscience in the child by a particular age 
(about age eight according to both Mead and Piaget). Yet this is not the complele slory. 
If il were, the social bond would have continued to be the most important resource 
serving to keep youlhs from engaging in delinquency from the perspective of Hirschi's 
theory. This is not the end of the slory because, as we have seen in Parsons' system, there 
is an even slill higher level of organization of lhe persona lily thal sits at the pinnacle of 
the cybernetic hierarchy. This is Lbe identity, and it coincides wiLb the evaluative level of 
the social bond, namely belief. Bolh serve pattern II1'lintenance and lension manage· 
ment funclions for Lbeir respective areas. 
A WORD ABOUT SElF AND IDENTITY 
Before moving on to the last section, some words are in order regarding the concepts of 
self and identity, especially as lhey have been lreated in the above discussion. From lhe 
symbolic interactionisl perspeclive, by the "self" is meanl lhe process of rel1exivilY 
emanaling from the internal dialogue between the "I" and the "M.e" (Gecas and Burke 
1995). The self arises oul of this process of rel1ectin g back on one's own thoughts and 
actions in interaction with others. 
\Vhereas Lbe self represents Lbis process of rel1exivity and embeddedness in ongoing 
group activities, the "self-concept" can be thought of as the sum total of lhe individual's 
thoughts and feelings about him- or herself as an object (Rosenberg 1979; Gecas and 
Burke 1995:42; Reitzes and M.utran 2003). However, since the self is through and 
through a product of society, the meanings attached to whom or what kind of person 
one is cannot be limited lo self-concepts alone. "TdenlilY," then, represenls the various 
meanings attached lo oneself by self and 0 Lbers. Tn this sense, "identity is the most public 
aspect of self" (Geeas and Burke 1995:42). Anotller way of thinking about this is that 
identities are meanings attributed to the self as object (Stets 1995). 
Although Parsons has occasionally claimed thal his social psycholof..'y is compatible 
with the M.eadian-inl1uenced sociological social psychology summarized above, many 
observers simply do not accepl this claim.5 This is because Parsons (1964, 1968b, 
1977) draws much more from Freud than he does from Cooley, M.ead, and olher 
pragmatists and symbolic interactionists for his ·working understandings of the social 
psychology of the person and of social interaction more generally. For example, 
Parsons rarely writes about the "self," preferring instead Freud's Ego to refer to the 
active and reflective human subject who can take himself or herself into account as an 
object as well. 
For Freud, the Ego balances the raw passions tileled by libido energy (from the Id) 
and the requirements of living and operating in an outer social world (the Superego). 
This is the "reality principle" and Ego is the rational component of the personality 
system because of the work it does in synthesizing inner needs and outer reality (Allport 
1968:29). When Parsons locates Freud's Ego in the G-subsystem of the personality 
system, this is also where the self-the self of symbolic interactionism-should be 
located. Yet confusions may still exist Note, for example, that interaction theory explains 
the stability of the personality by way of Mead's "self" (i.e., stable meanings toward 
oneself as an object), while Parsonian action theory explains it by way of Freud's 
"identily" (stable orientalions toward oneself as an object; see Turner [1974:287]). In the 
Parsonian framework identity represenls the highest·-order stability of lhe personality 
(inl1uenced by Freud) while symbolic inleractionists tend lo see lhe self as lhe mosl 
slable locus of social psychological processes and altribules. In other words, observers 
may still be left to wonder where the "self" truly belongs in Parsons' personalily system. 
Here, it is importIml to sorl out any lingering confusions with regard to the concepL':I self, 
idenlily, and Ego in Parsons' theory. 
One thing we know for certain is thal within the personality syslem, Parsons places 
identily in the L-subsystem and Ego in the G-subsystem (see Figure 4). This means thal 
although Parsons rarely explicitly refers to lhe self, it should nevertheless be seen as 
equivalent lo Freud's Ego, and hence, belongs in the G-subsystem. If this is Lbe case, how 
can self--conlrol properly be conceplualized if the self is relegated lo the relatively low 
level (cybernelically speaking) of goal-altainment? This seeming conundrum is easily 
solved if il is kept in mind thal idenlily is a higher-order aspect of self. The self in effect 
provides the conditions (being itself higher in energy) for identity, which is higher in 
informalion. Indeed, slructural social psychologists such as Sheldon Stryker and Peler 
Burke view identity as more slable than the self as well (see, e.g., Stryker 1981; Burke 
1997; Stryker and Burke 2000). 
Burke's (1997, 2004) idenlily control theory conceptualizes human social inlerac-
tion as a cybernetic system in which information from the environment from other 
actors, and from the self is compared to actors' internal identity standards (the "com-
parator"). Il is out of this system lhat idenlilies (or self--concepls) in roles emerge, and 
in lhis sense is similar to Parsons' own cybernetic syslem of persona lily. Indeed, il cou ld 
be said thal Parsons' theory is an idenlily conlrol theory, differenl from Burke's version 
only to the extenl that Parsons draws on Freud for key elemenls of the theory. 'Athat lhis 
implies is thal if Parsons is compatible with symbolic interaclionism al all, il is with lhe 
Stryker/Burke wing of slructural social psychology (see, e.g., Stryker 2001). Tn Parsons' 
system, lhen, the "self" of symbolic interaclionism is assimilated to the Freudian Ego and 
located in the G-subsystem of Lbe personality system. This makes Parsons' Lbeory of 
personality a true identity control theory, to the extent that identity sits atop the 
cybernetic hierarchy of controL6 
_Although this formulation of Parsons may indeed violate standard symbolic interac-
tionist notions of self and identity-and the analytical connection ben"reen the two-for 
purposes of this discussion -whether or not Parsons maintains fidelity to the Meadian line 
on self and identity is irrelevant. "Vhat is relevant, however, is how Parsons' formulation 
impacts the attempt to subsume Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) conceptualization of 
self-control and by extension, the self, under his own AGIL schema. Although, with 
respect to the l\ledian selt~ Parsons is all thumbs, so are Gottfredson and Hirschi. 
Gottfredson and Hirschi in fact are purposely oblivious to the conceptual issues regarding 
the self that have been discussed in this section. For them, the "self" is simply the human 
person, and that is about the extentofit? Strip ped to its bare essentials, this means that the 
Gottfredson/Hirschi self is easily incorporated into Parsons' more conceptually elaborate 
framework for explaining self and identilyprocesses. Subsumed under Parsons' lbeoryin 
this way, Hirschi's self-control is now treated as identity contro1.5 
CONCLUSION: GENERATING A SET OF TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
Now lhal it has been demonstrated how Hirschi's social bond and self-control theories 
can be subsumed under Parsons' AGJL schema, it is now time lo indicale lhe sorts of 
hypotheses thal logically can be derived from Lbe lheoretical reformulation. Some of 
these hypotheses are consistenl with the criminologicalliteralure that has tested various 
aspecls of Hirschi's theories, while olhers-especially those lhat predicl there should be 
slrong associations between the strenglh of the social bond and levels of self-control----
are new. Here, then, are some of those hypoLbeses. 
Hypothesis 1. Among the four element" of the social bond, belief (as approprialely  
operationalized) will be the single besl predictor of delinquency/deviance rates.  
Hypothesis 2. Among lhe four elements of the social bond, attachment will be the  
second best prediclor of delinquency/deviance rates.  
Hypothesis 3. Among the four elements of lhe social bond, the additive effects of  
belief and attachment will belter predicl rates of deviance or delinquency lhan the  
additive effects of commitment and involvement.  
Hypothesis 4. As belief increases, self-control increases.  
Hypothesis 5. As attachment increases, self-control increases.  
Hypothesis 6. As the additive effect of belief and attachment increases, self-control  
increases.  
Hypothesis 7. As the strength of the social bond increases, self-control increases.  
Hypothesis 8. The additive effecls of belief and attachment will better predict levels  
of self-controllhan the additive effecL" of commitment and involvement..  
Hypothesis 9. As self--conlrol increases, rates of delinquency/deviance decrease.  
Hypothesis 10. Because in patriarchal societies boys are less heavily supervised than  
girls (as parl of the rouline workings of socialization), boys will have weaker social  
bonds than girls.  
Hypothesis 1 L Because in patriarchal societies boys are less heavily supervised than  
girls (as part of the routine workings of socialization), boys will have lm"rer self- 
control than girls.  
Hypothesis 12. Because in patriarchal societies boys are less heavily supervised than  
girls (as part of the routine workings of socialization), boys will have higher delin- 
quency rates than girls.  
Hypotheses 1-3 reflect the cybernetic ordering of the elements of the social bond,  
and because belief and attachment are the highest in information relative to the other 
two elements of the bond (commitment and involvement), it is argued that they will 
playa more prominent role in predicting rates of delinquency and/or deviance more 
generally. Hypotheses 4-8 reflect the fact that since belief and attachment are more 
important (l.e., higher in information cybernetically) relative to the two other elements 
of the social the bond, -when they increase either independently or in tandem, 
self-control is predicted to increase as well (the obverse of the relationship between these 
two elements of the social bond and delinquency covered in Hypotheses 1-3). Allhough 
many more hypotheses logically can be derived from lhe two groups of hypotheses, 
Hypotheses 1-3 and HypoLbeses 4-8, Hypothesis 9 is one such example of how the 
relationship between self-control and delinquency can be predicted. Finally, Hypolheses 
10-12 are logically derived from Parsons' discussion of Lbe nature of gender socializa-
tion (see, e.g., Parsons 1955, 1964), which predicls both lower rates of self-control and 
higher rates of delinquency for boys relative to girls.9 
An article by Longshore el a1. (2004) finds empirical supporl for many of these 
propositions, even as the authors fail to notice lhe relevance of Parsons' lheory with 
regard to ils subsumplion of both the social bonding and self-control theories of 
Hirschi. For example, the bivariate relationship between low self-control and juvenile 
drug use was fully mediated by subslance--using peers as well as by moral belief. In fact, 
belief (serving the L-function wiLbin lhe Parsons' schema) was always the strongesl 
predictor of delinquency among the four elements of the social bond. Additionally, all 
four elemenls of the social bond were significanlly related to self-conlrol, just as pre-
dicted in our newly integrated lheory. 
Longshore el a1. (2004) inlimate that for the sake of parsimony, an inlegrated lheory 
incorporating bOlh social bonding and self-control theory is needed. As I have shown, 
such an integrated lheoryis already available in the guise of Parsons' systems theory. Even 
wilh lhe strongly supportive evidence found in the Longshore el a1. (2004) study, because 
of Lbe probabilistic nature of social phenomena, no sociological theory will approach 
even close lo 100 percent accuracy regarding it<; predictions. There will always be negative 
cases, and because of lhis, research which fails to confirm any number of hypotheses 
derived from a particular theory should not necessarily evenluale in a rejection of the 
Lbeory at that point. DiCristina (2006) poinL<; oul that although most social scienlists 
adhere to Popper's notion offalsifiability ---- namely, the allempt to accumulale "facts" that 
cha llenge a theory-it has never been clear how many negative cases are needed before a 
theory can be rejecled. If the evidence is either positive, weak, or mixed -----bulcertainly not 
consistently negative-as is the case for Hirschi's self-control and social bonding theories, 
then it is irrational to reject a theory on the basis of these "crucial" tests alone.:o 
As this article represents only a starting point in the attempt to develop a systematic 
approach, which integrates both self-control and social bonding theory under Parsons' 
AGIL schema, much work remains to be done, especially in terms of the operational-
ization of key concepts of the theory. Indeed, perhaps the single leading factor producing 
variations in the support (or lack thereof) of Hirschi's social bonding and self-control 
theories has been the varying ways such key concepts as self-control, attachments, 
beliefs, commitments, and involvement have been operationallzed by different researc h-
ers (see Kempf 1993; Le Banc and Caplan 1993; Marcus 2004). Now subsumed under a 
more general, overarching theoretical system, it is anticipated that greater consistency 
and precision -will be brought to bear not only with regard to operationalization, but also 
on the ,,,rhole range of issues touching upon deviance and its relation to self-control and 
the nature of the social bond. 
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NOTES 
lHence, even GottfredsOIl and Hirschi's (1990; Hirschi and C01:1:fredson 2000, 2001) so-called 
"general theory of crime" is middle-range in that, even though it plllports to treat the totality of 
phenomena encompassing crnne and de\i.ance, deviance itself is merely one aspect of the greater 
lotalily of human phenomena that llleorists such as Talcott Parsons have endeavored to explain 
under a single, comprehensive metatheoretical framework (Wellford 1989). 
2Hirschi (1979) and Liska et al. (1989) use the term "up-and--down integration" to refer to this 
deductive form of theoretical integration. As Liska et a1. (1989:10) ex:plain, this form of theo-
retical integration "is accomplished by identifying a level of abstraction or generality that will 
incorporate some of the conceptualization of the constituent theories." Hirschi (1989) is gen-
erally opposed to the sort of theoretical integration or reduction being discussed here. 
3Forpurposes ofbrevity, I state several of my working assumptions here. First, the debate between 
proponents and critics of Parsons that began in the 1950s is so "vell known to sociologists that it 
needs no further elaboration here (see Turner 2001). Second, I assume that readers of this article 
are familiar with the basic points of both Hirschi's and Parsons' theories since they are both 
sociologists and are both heavily cited and discussed. Third, the justification for selecting 
Parsons' grand theory over other candidate theories in sociology (e.g., LuhlIh1.nn, Giddens, 
Bourdieu, or Habermas) is that it is best to subsume a functionalist micro- or meso-level theory 
(which J-lirsc.bi's control theory is) into a functionalist grand theory; and among the leading 
grand theories Parsons' is clearly the most purely functional. Fourth, Parsons' work, and func--
tionalism more generally, are still pertinent to contemporary theorizing and research in sociol-
ogy and elsewhere. For recent writings that argue for the continuing viability of functionalism in 
general and Parsons' thought in particular, see Gerhardt (2000,2002,2005), Hare (2003), King 
(2004), Fish (2005), Fox et al. (2005), Toby (2005), Chattoe (2006), and Kinkaid (2007). 
4Culture, in this sense, is to the social system what DNA is to the organism. DNA, which is high 
in infOrmation, "controls" the constitution, makeup, and appearance of the organism (ontog--
eny). Additionally, DNA is, like cult me, passed down from generation to generation as organisms 
procreate and pass on their genetic heritage to offspring (phylogeny). 
sFor discussions of Parsons' relation-or lack thereof-to symbolic interactjonism, see Blumer 
(l975a,b), Parsons (1968a, 1975), and Turner (1974, 1975). 
6In essence, Freud's singularly important insight for Parsons was that the internalization of group 
norms at the level of the Ego become the sdfs more general identity (Manning 2005:110). 
7TIlis is closest to Tames's (1890) notion of the "material self," although Hirschi has never framed 
his understanding of self in this way. 
s'lbis means that Burke's identity control theory is also now subsumable under Parsons' more 
general and abstract theory. By reason oflimitations of space, however, this argument cannot be 
explored here. 
~Hayslett -McCall and Bernard (2002) argue that the otherwise disparate concepts of self-control 
and attachment (especi.--illy in the case of boys) can be successfully linked by overcoming the 
underspecification of the concept of "self" inherent in Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) treat-
ment. They do this by utilizing the developmental psychology of John Bowlby (1969), which is 
consistent with the way Parsons understands and interprets Freud. Although there is no problem 
with this in and of itself, Bowlby provides a link from self-control to only one dimension of the 
social bond-attachment-while Parsons provides links to all four dimensions. 
10For more on falsifiability and the irrationality of reject.ing theories on the basis of the existence 
of weak or mixed support in the test of hypotheses, see \·Vagner (2000) and DiCristina (2006). 
For a comprehensive overview of the empirical slatus of Hirschi's self-conlrol and social 
bonding theories, see Kempf ( [993). 
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